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ABSTRACT 
This article models the choice process of managers belonging to the same 
marketing channel, with regard to the hedging services provided by financial derivatives 
exchanges. Insight is gained into the risk-spreading process in the channel, the use of price 
risk management instruments and its effect on the channel structure. The model has been 
empirically tested on a set of data gathered in a stratified sample of 467 producers, 50 
traders and 18 managers in the processing industry. The data were obtained through 
computer-assisted personal interviews with the producers which lasted about 45 minutes 
and a survey among traders and managers in the processing industry. Logistic regression 
models are used to test the relationships in our model. Implications for financial 
derivatives exchanges offering price risk management instruments in terms of service 
design (that is security design) and service delivery are discussed, and directions for future 
research are indicated. 
KEYWORDS: Risk management, Channel members 
INTRODUCTION 
Modeling managerial decision-making behavior concerning the use of price risk 
management instruments (PRMIs) in companies is still virgin territory. In financial 
literature much attention has been paid to valuation models for financial derivatives and 
optimal security design. The efficient functioning of financial institutions has also 
received considerable attention. In marketing literature, attention has been directed 
towards developing methods and techniques to detect consumer needs and wishes. Both 
approaches yield information valuable to financial institutions. 
However, in order to give a financial institution clues as to how it can improve its 
financial product, insight is required into the factors that entrepreneurs weigh in their 
decision for or against using the financial products which the financial institution offers. In 
the financial literature, many optimal portfolio models have been developed. These models 
are normative: they indicate how an entrepreneur should compose his or her portfolio, that 
is, which derivatives are to be used and how many of them. 
Nevertheless, recent studies show that these models are unable to describe the 
behavior of entrepreneurs towards financial derivatives. Furthermore, those portfolio 
models fail to take into account price risk shifting in the marketing channel which the 
entrepreneur enters. Therefore, these models do not provide insight into how financial 
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services offered by financial derivatives exchanges can be improved in order to generate 
more volume on these markets. This article looks at the financial service provided by the 
exchange, from the perspective of an entrepreneur trying to reduce the risk he or she 
perceives within his market channel. Moreover, the article investigates how a financial 
institution can improve its financial products. 
This article attemps to provide an insight into the factors which determine the of 
the entrepreneurs in a marketing channel to use financial derivatives for the same 
underlying commodity and to determine the way in which these companies differ in their 
decision making behavior. Moreover, we will analyse the effect of the behavior of 
entrepreneurs concerning PRMIs on the channel structure and draw conclusions from it 
about service design and service delivery of exchange-listed PRMIs. 
First, a framework is developed consisting of three channel members: producers, 
traders and the processing industry. It shows the different relationships between the 
channel members, in particular relationships dealing with price risk management. The 
decision making behavior of each of these channel members with regard to PRMIs is then 
modeled. These models describe actual behavior towards the use of futures contracts and 
the intention to use options, the latter instrument was not yet available to the respondents 
in our empirical study. The models developed are able to explain how and why managers 
and entrepreneurs make choices with respect to PRMIs. The models contain the 
characteristics of both company and the entrepreneur/manager. Thereafter, a comparison is 
made of the models which have been determined by the different channel members. 
Having gained insight into the channel members' decisions with respect to PRMIs and 
into the differences between the channel members in this respect, the implications for price 
risk management policy in the channel are derived. Next, the managerial implications for 
the service design and service delivery of securities are indicated. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Developing Choice Models for Managers, Who Participate in a Marketing Channel, 
for the Hedging Services Provided by Financial Derivatives Markets 
In financial literature it is frequently argued that the success of a PRMI is heavily 
dependent on both its design and the characteristics of the underlying asset's cash market 
(Black, 1986). Gray (1987) identifies the importance of contract design. He argues that a 
PRMI must reflect the commercial movement of the asset both closely and broadly enough 
to avoid price distortions resulting from specifications in the PRMI. An empirical study by 
Silber (1981) concludes that PRMIs whose specifications closely reflect the needs of 
hedgers seem more likely to succeed. Tashjian and McConnell (1989) show that hedging 
effectiveness is a very important determinant in explaining the success of PRMIs. In 
accordance with these recent findings, particular attention has been paid to the hedging 
effectiveness of futures as an example of a PRMI widely traded on financial derivatives 
exchanges. Authors who have proposed measures of this effectiveness include, Ederington 
(1979), Hsin, Kuo and Lee (1994) and Pennings and Meulenberg (1997). Common to all 
these measures is that they try to indicate the extent to which hedgers are able to reduce 
cash price risk by using a particular PRMI. It has been argued that the motivation for 
hedging by offsetting PRMIs is not to reduce the cash price risk of single assets but to 
reduce the residual risk of the firm (Anderson and Danthine, 1980; Anderson and 
Danthine, 1981; Rolfo, 1980; Zilcha and Broil, 1992). Therefore, we will investigate risk 
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management behavior towards both inputs and outputs. To do so we will look at the price 
risk management behavior of enterprises that are within the same marketing channel. 
The conceptual model consists of three channel members: 1) the producer of raw 
material (in this stage raw material is the output), 2) the trader in raw material (in this 
stage raw material is both input and output) and 3) the processor of raw material (in this 
stage raw material is the input). 
Actors in marketing channels take decisions about PRMIs individually. 
Interdependency may occur between the decisions of individual actors. For instance, the use 
of PRMIs by a producer of raw materials may depend upon the PRMI-decisions with respect 
to that raw material by the wholesaler or the processor he or she is supplying. In that case the 
use of PRMIs has truly become an issue of marketing channel. Characteristics of individual 
actors that influence decision making with respect to PRMIs include: price variance, the 
degree of risk seeking/aversion, and the costs of hedging. As a result of differences in these 
variables the willingness to use PRMIs can differ between actors in the marketing channel. 
Another channel-aspect of decision making with respect to PRMIs is that it can be a 
sequential process. The most risk averse actor might decide first to use a PRMI and other 
channel-actors may follow suit, while taking into account the decisions made by the first 
user. Also, the type of PRMI used by an actor in the channel can depend on his or her 
channel power. For instance, when the user of a raw material has strong channel power, he or 
she might enforce upon a supplier a forward contract at a suitable price instead of executing 
a hedge in the futures market. Whether a channel actor is using PRMIs to get rid of risks 
also depends on his or her relationships with other actors in the marketing system and with 
actors supportive to his or her business. Cases in point are banks and shareholders. 
In this article we will not analyze all the factors that influence decision making with 
respect to PRMIs in marketing channels. Rather, we focus on a number of characteristics 
related to the PRMI decision making of individual channel actors and on related aspects of 
dependency between PRMI decisions in the marketing channel. 
Our model presupposes the presence of a futures contract for the raw material 
concerned. Futures contracts are standardized legal agreements to make or take delivery of 
a specific commodity at a designated place sometime in the future. Futures contracts are 
traded on futures exchanges and make it possible for those who want to manage price risk 
hedgers, to transfer risk (hedging service of the exchange) to those who are willing to 
accept it speculators (speculation service of the exchange). It is, therefore, interesting to 
study the channel members' behavior towards this price risk management instrument and 
its meaning for the risk-spreading process in the channel and for the channel structure (as a 
whole). Furthermore, this study investigates the channel members' position towards a new 
PRMI, as yet unavailable to our respondents, the option. 
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Figure 1. Price risk management in the marketing channel. 
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of our conceptual model. It discerns 
the physical and value flow from the financial service flow. The value flow, in our model 
is directly deducted from the price of raw materials and is volatile and introduces risk. 
Whether or not channel members will make use of financial services depends on several 
factors that do not necessarily have to be the same for each channel member. By making 
use of the services that a financial derivatives exchange has to offer, this risk can be 
eliminated. The use of these services can, in turn, have an effect on the different channel 
members' choice of channel and hence on the entire channel structure. 
We want to test some hypotheses about the use of PRMIs which are related to the 
individual actors and the channel structure. On the basis of in-depth interviews (i.e. 
organized group discussions with entrepreneurs) and desk research the following 
hypotheses can be formulated. 
Hypotheses related to the individual actor 
If entrepreneurs have a higher awareness of price fluctuations in the cash market 
and hence are aware of the risks they face in the cash market (assuming the price is 
difficult to predict) and if entrepreneurs are risk-averse, they will be more inclined to use 
PRMIs. 
Hypothesis 1. Risk aversion in the case of risk perception will have a positive relation 
with the use of price risk management instruments. 
The legal form of a company will influence the manager's price risk management 
strategy. In general, the manager of a limited liability company will have to generate a 
continuous return on the invested assets. This makes risk management, and consequently 
the use of PRMIs, important in risk-bearing surroundings/settings. Entrepreneurs running 
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a one-man business without the obligation of realizing returns for stock holders will 
therefore feel no pressing commitment to risk management. 
Hypothesis 2. The degree to which a manager is focused on shareholder interests will 
have a positive influence on the use of price risk management instruments. 
By using PRMIs, for instance futures contracts, a company can fix the price of a 
raw material in advance. This is a very drastic form of risk management, all risk being 
eliminated. Implicitly this means that all price dynamics, also those advantageous to the 
company, will no longer have any influence on the result. For a company with a 
downward-risk goal (return on investment should be at least x percent, anything above it is 
welcome) options probably are a better alternative. After all, the use of options allows for 
a bottom or ceiling market price thereby allowing the company to take advantage of 
favorable price developments. 
Hypothesis 3. A downward-risk goal is positively related to the intention to use options 
Hypothesis related to the channel structure 
Many firms have multiple inputs and outputs, and it is not reasonable to assume 
that the firm is interested in the isolated price-risk management of a single input or output. 
A more plausible goal for a firm's risk management activities would be to protect the 
firm's overall financial performance. Covering only one input or one output may even 
introduce additional risks. Therefore, a company will sooner cover the price of raw 
material, when the other variable means of production can be covered as well. 
Hypothesis 4. When a firm has the possibility of covering the risk of its entire 
production complex, it will sooner use a price risk management instrument than it 
would have without this possibility. 
METHOD OF RESEARCH 
Research Context 
Our study uses for its subjects Dutch entrepreneurs and managers of medium-sized 
and large hog farms, hog traders and managers of slaughterhouses. In the Netherlands, the 
hog industry is one of the most important industries in agriculture and faces heavy price 
fluctuations. The Netherlands has 18 slaughterhouses processing hogs into meat 
components and sell these components to wholesalers and retailers. Moreover, these meat 
packers export a large proportion of pork components. The traders serve as intermediaries 
between the hog farmer on the one hand and the slaughterhouses and exporters of live 
hogs on the other. The slaughterhouses are run by managers, whereas the hog farms and 
hog trading firms are often family firms. 
In the Netherlands, there is a futures market for hogs, in which entrepreneurs can 
fix the price of their live slaughter hogs in advance. This implies that research into the use 
of futures contracts allows us to study actual behavior: do people use futures contracts or 
not? In the case of options, we can (only) measure the intention to use options, should they 
become available. 
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Research Design 
Prior to the quantitative study, in-depth interviews were held with 40 farmers, 10 
hog traders and 5 managers of slaughterhouses to provide insight into decision-making 
structure. Both the in-depth interviews and desk research formed the basis for the 
operationalization of the models. The goal of the depth interviews was to gain insight into 
the decision-making process involved in using PRMIs. More specifically, we wanted to 
gain insight into the criteria managers use when deciding either to use or futures contracts 
or not. Care was taken to select some managers who had been involved in futures trading 
before and other managers who had not been involved in futures trading at all. The depth 
interviews took place in an informal atmosphere and each session lasted for about two and 
a half hours. For the producers, we developed a personal computer-assisted interview. The 
sample frame for this interview was stratified according to the variables 'region' and 'size 
of enterprise'. The interview had several sections. After having posed some background 
questions (for example, on size of enterprise, previous behavior regarding price risk 
management), the respondents were subjected to two experiments which measured risk 
attitude by means of the certainty equivalence technique and strength of preference by 
means of the rating technique. This was followed by a measurement of the relative 
intention to use futures contracts and options. The interview then continued with items that 
measured the entrepreneurs' characteristics. All the interviewers had prior interviewing 
experience, and had gone through an extensive 'training program for the assessment 
procedures. Moreover the training program ensured that the interviewers understood the 
questions posed to the entrepreneurs. In 1996, a total of 467 producers were interviewed. 
A similar survey was conducted among managers of slaughterhouses and hog traders. 
In 1997 questionnaires were sent to all slaughterhouses and hog traders, a total of 
150 in all. Before the questionnaires were sent, telephone contact had been made with the 
managers concerned to make sure the questionnaires were addressed to the right person 
and to inform those concerned that a query was coming their way. Sixty-five 
questionnaires were returned, which means our sample covered over 43 % of the total 
population. 
Measures 
Most characteristics of the company and the entrepreneur, such as legal form, can 
be measured objectively. The constructs characterizing managers and entrepreneurs were 
measured by scales such as those developed in marketing, psychology, and management. 
Analysis 
The data obtained from the 550 respondents constitutes the input for the 
quantitative part of the research. The relations between managers' characteristics and 
company characteristics and the use of price risk management instruments, as well as the 
relations between the channel members will be tested using logistic regression. This 
provides the possibility of being able to test our hypothesis empirically. 
The models describing the actual use of futures contracts are choice models where 
the choice is binary and refers to revealed preferences, that is past behavior. Since in these 
models choice is a binary variable, we model the probability of choosing one of the 
alternatives by logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). Logistic regression 
analysis estimates the coefficients of the predictors, such that the likelihood of the data fed 
into the model is maximized. As a measure of model fit, we provide the improvement of 
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the - 2 log likelihood as compared to the - 2 log likelihood of the null model which consist 
only an intercept. The higher the chi-square value of this model, the better it describes the 
binary choice model. 
RESULTS' 
During the interview, the respondent was asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (not 
risky at all) to 9 (very risky) the extent to which he or she felt the hog market was risky. 
An average score of 7.5, 7.3, 7.4 and a standard deviation of 2.1, 1.8, 1.7 for the 
producers, traders and processors suggest that the hog market is perceived as risky. 
Producers 
Using logistic regression, risk attitude and the extent to which producers are able to 
fix both input and output prices appeared to be strongly positively related to the use of 
futures contracts. The model significantly improves the fit compared to the null model with 
only an intercept (p < 0.001), thereby supporting Hypotheses 1 and 4. Since the producers in 
our sample are mainly one-man businesses, no relation was found between the legal form 
and the use of futures contracts. 
In order to gain more insight into the producers' choice of marketing channel and 
their risk attitude, we split the producers into two groups. The first group sells slaughter hogs 
on the free market (i.e. directly to the slaughterhouse or the trader), the second group sells 
slaughter hogs to a cooperative. The split shows the entrepreneur's preference for either a 
price risk-bearing market channel or a risk-reducing market channel. As expected, a 
significant difference in risk attitude was found between entrepreneurs who sell directly onto 
the free market and entrepreneurs who supply cooperatives, the latter being less risk-seeking 
(p<0.025). This result is in line with Hypothesis 1. Logistic regression enables us to gain 
insight into the decision-making behavior of producers regarding the use of options. In their 
decision for or against using options the following variables are of importance: the decision 
unit's opinion of options (ß= 1.14, p = 0.005), risk attitude (ß= 0.381, p = 0.017), interaction 
between risk perception and risk attitude (ß= 0.05, p = 0.07), and understanding of options 
(ß= 0.630, p = 0.000). The model significantly improves the fit compared to the null model 
with only an intercept (p < 0.001 ). 
Processors 
Because 18 interviews are available to the processors, the hypotheses are tested by 
using correlation coefficients between variables. The interviews show that risk aversion is 
positively correlated to the extent to which a slaughterhouse makes use of futures contracts 
(r= 0.65, p = 0.03), thereby supporting Hypothesis 1 ' No relation was found between the 
1
 Lack of space prevents the authors from reporting all the statistics of the logistic 
regressions. Readers who are interested in these statistics are welcome to contact the 
authors. 
2
 Since we conduct a correlation analysis, we did not use actual market behavior -using or 
not using futures contracts- for a variable here (this is, after all, a binary choice). Instead 
we use the variable which indicates the extent to which the company uses futures 
contracts. 
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extent to which futures markets are used and the legal form, thereby rejecting Hypothesis 2. 
Note that the sample contained little variation as to legal form. A clear relation was found 
between the processor's downward-risk goal and the intention to use options (r= 0.54, p = 
0.05), thereby supporting Hypothesis 3. The extent to which futures markets were used 
depended strongly on the processors' opportunity to hedge both input and output (r = 0.71, 
p= 0.02), thereby supporting Hypothesis 4. 
Traders 
Using logistic regression, it appeared that risk attitude and legal form are strongly 
positively related to the use of futures contracts. The model significantly improves the fit 
compared to the null model with only an intercept (p < 0.001), thereby supporting hypothesis 
1 and 2. The extent to which traders are able to fix both input and output prices was not 
significant in logistic regression, thereby rejecting hypothesis 4. The intention to use options 
and a downward-risk goal were significantly related (r= 0.47, p= 0.05), thereby supporting 
hypothesis 3. 
These results indicate out that differences exist between the market channel members 
as far as their relationship to price risk management is concerned. For all channel members 
knowledge about financial derivatives appeared to be an important determinant in choosing 
for or against hedging. The risk with regard to raw materials is largely borne by the 
producers. They appeared to be the least risk-averse óf all channel members. 
In our empirical study, the producers are mainly family companies, where the 
entrepreneur has no obligation to other parties to realize a return on his or her capital (there 
being no shareholders). The possibility of using options to fix a bottom or ceiling price in the 
market is greeted with enthusiasm among the channel members. Risk attitude concerning the 
company's performance is an important determinant in the decision to either use or shun 
price risk management instruments. The channel members who hold power in the channel, in 
our case the retailers, actually use their power to shift the risk to other channel members, thus 
avoiding having to use the services of financial markets. 
The producers' choice of channel also depends on their risk attitude. Producers 
evaluate channels using several criteria including the risk they introduce. Based on their own 
risk attitude they then choose a relatively safe or relatively risky channel. Therefore, the 
choice of market channel is also a part of entrepreneurs risk management strategy. 
DISCUSSION 
Strategic Implications for Financial Derivatives Markets from a Service Marketing 
Perspective 
Services marketing has only recently emerged as a discipline in the field of 
marketing (Fisk, Brown & Bitner, 1993; Swartz, Bowen & Brown, 1992). As they 
constitute an immensely diverse number of industries, it is difficult to define exactly and 
unambiguously the nature of services (Grönroos, 1990). Consequently, authors have 
focused their attention on finding features which distinguish services from goods (Bowen 
& Schneider, 1988; Zeithaml, Parasuraman & Berry, 1985). Intangibility presents a 
challenge to new service development, as it requires management of the financial 
derivatives exchange to cooperate closely with customers and to stress the use of tangible 
cues to make the service more physical. Tangible cues in the financial derivatives industry 
are the trading floor, the information provided by the trading system and the clearing 
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system. Furthermore, intangibility may diminish the period of time needed to complete the 
new product development process for services. As a result, the financial derivatives 
industry may be able to respond more quickly and adequately to customers' needs. 
However, as services can be easily imitated ("me-too" products), this had lead to an 
increased proliferation of similar services in the financial derivatives industry (de 
Brentani, 1991; Easingwood, 1986; Pennings, 1998; Shostack 1984; Storey & 
Easingwood, 1996). 
Level of understanding, risk attitude and legal form are related to the use of futures 
contracts, confirming our Hypotheses 1 and 2. In order to increase the understanding of the 
services provided by financial derivatives exchanges, the exchange might develop training 
programs for managers. These programs may be seen as a tangible cue to make the 
hedging service as a whole more tangible. It seems interesting to the exchange to direct its 
attention towards companies that particularly focus on shareholder value interests. 
In the decision to use the services provided by options, the determinants that are 
decisive are different to operative in determining the use of futures. This implies that the 
marketing of financial derivatives is service specific. The objective concerning profit 
fluctuations, for example having a downward risk goal or not appearing to bear a clear 
relation with the intention to use options (Hypothesis 3). In our study, this implies that it 
would be interesting for the Amsterdam Exchanges to conduct further research into the 
feasibility of options on slaughter hogs. Our results show that the motivation for reducing 
risk by offsetting PRMIs is not to reduce the cash price risk of single commodities but to 
reduce the residual risk of the firm, that is all inputs and outputs (Hypothesis 4). The 
Warenterminbörse in Hannover (Germany) starts trading futures contracts in 1998. This 
exchange is going to list several related futures complexes, such as the hog futures 
complex which will include piglet futures, feed futures and hog futures. Gathering 
information on the production structures particular to different industries seems to be of 
great importance to financial institutions. Computer technology and advancements in 
telecommunications will make this increasingly easier in the future which will, in turn, 
lead to improvements in the structure of financial institutions (Merton 1995). It is 
important to gain further insight into the risk management alternatives of entrepreneurs. The 
risk management services offered by the exchange may serve as a substitute for vertical 
integration and will influence the channel choice (risky versus safe). Our study, for 
example, showed that the choice of market channel is used by producers as a risk 
management tool. Moreover investigating the interdependency between the channel 
members regarding their risk management behavior would be an interesting avenue to 
explore in future. 
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